Abstract-Secure Semantic Web applications, particularly those involving access control, are typically focused at the application-domain only, rather than taking a more holistic approach to also include the underlying infrastructure (for example, firewalls). As a result, infrastructure configurations may unintentionally hinder and prohibit the normal operation of the Semantic Web. This paper, discusses an approach involving Description Logic and the Semantic Web Rule Language to provide synergy and alignment between firewall configurations and semantic-aware application configurations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Semantic Web [1] builds on application domain ontologies in order to provide a framework for web-resource reasoning and interoperation. Semantic Web applications are typically modeled at the application-domain (knowledge) level [2] , [3] and tend not to consider the underlying infrastructure: it is assumed that the underlying infrastructure is suitably configured to support the application and its web-resources. However, there are situations where the infrastructure configuration may work against the normal operation of the Semantic Web and it becomes necessary to consider some knowledge about the infrastructure and how it relates the application knowledge.
A practical reality of any system-regardless of the application it supports-is that a firewall policy is applied to incoming and outgoing traffic. A Semantic Web application may span many systems and, as a consequence, its proper operation is dependent on the firewall configuration at each system. An overly-restrictive configuration may prevent normal interaction of web-resources resulting in application failure. An overlypermissive configuration, while permitting normal operation of the application, may leave the system vulnerable to attack, for example, across open ports.
While the Semantic Web may provide applications with security services that are domain-knowledge aware [4] , [5] , it is argued that firewalls still have a role to play in securing the low-level infrastructure. Not only do firewalls protect services that do not provide built-in application-level security, it is considered best practice to rely on multiple layers of security, providing 'belt and braces'. In practice, deploying a firewall for a web-server or web-client is not simply about opening port 80 on the server for all traffic; one may wish to deny certain nodes (IP addresses, etc.), only accept HTTP traffic from some nodes, require other nodes to use HTTPS and also deal with HTTP traffic that is tunneled through proxies available on other ports. Furthermore, web-services do not necessarily communicate on port 80. In addition, firewall content sanitation (application layer) provides fine-grained access control that may cut across the host-based access controls; for example, certain content may be permitted (or denied) only to/from particular nodes.
Firewall configurations can be complex, run to many thousands of rules and are typically maintained on an ad-hoc basis [6] , [7] , [8] . New rules are added with little regard to existing rules and may result an overly-restrictive and/or overly-permissive configuration. The ideal firewall configuration is one that is aligned with the application supported by the system, that is, it permits valid application traffic, and, preferably, no more and no less.
The contribution of this paper is the alignment of firewall configurations with Semantic Web applications. An ontology is proposed for Linux Netfilter which is used to represent and reason about instances of firewall configurations. By bridging this ontology with the application ontology, it becomes possible to reason about how knowledge within the application may affect a firewall configuration, and vice-versa. For example, an airline service provider agent (web-service) may be willing to offer special discount services to preferred travel broker agents connecting through port 22 (ssh). Semantic agents can use this reasoning about the 'big picture' to infer new knowledge and better align firewall configurations to the application in an autonomic way.
The paper is organized as follows. Description Logic (DL) is used to represent the ontology; Section II provides an overview of DL; a more detailed discussion can be found in [9] . A DL representation of the Netfilter firewall ontology is given in Section III. Section V describes how the firewall ontology is bridged with the Semantic Web application E-Tourism casestudy outlined in Section IV. How the resulting ontology can be reasoned about is discussed in Section VI.
II. DESCRIPTION LOGIC & ONTOLOGIES
An ontology is an explicit specification of a conceptualisation using an agreed vocabulary and provides a rich set of constructs to build a more meaningful level of knowledge. An important characteristic of the Semantic Web (as constrained by DL) is that the information contained in it is specified using a formal language in order to enable automated reasoning and the derivation of new knowledge from existing knowledge.
Description Logic (DL) is a family of logic-based formalisms that forms part of the W3C recommendation for the Semantic Web [9] . DL uses classes (concepts) to represent sets of individuals (instances) and properties (roles) to represent binary relations applied to individuals. For example, the DL assertion:
ServerN ode N ode
∃hasSemanticService.Service ∃hasF irewall.F irewall specifies that a server node (class) hosts services (class) and has (property) a firewall (class) protecting them. Note that properties are conventionally prefixed by "has"; for instance, hasSemanticService, is the property over the individuals of the class ServerN ode (domain) that host Semantic Web services (range). The Semantic Web Rule Language, (SWRL), complements DL providing the ability to infer additional information in DL ontologies, but at the expense of decidability. SWRL rules are Horn-clause like rules written in terms of DL concepts, properties and individuals. A SWRL rule is composed of an antecedent part and a consequent part, both of which consist of positive conjunctions of atoms [10] . For example, the requirement: servers hosting ssh based semantic services protected by a firewall require that firewall to open port 22 is expressed in SWRL as:
Netfilter is a framework that enables packet filtering, network address translation (NAT) and packet mangling. As a firewall, it is both a stateful and stateless packet filter that is characterised by a sequence of firewall decisions against which all packets traversing the firewall are filtered. Each firewall decision takes the form of a series of conditions representing packet attributes that must be met in order for that decision to be applicable, with a consequent action for the matching packet (accept, drop, log and so forth).
Netfilter requires the specification of a 
[T able][ChainT ype][F ilterConditions][T argetDecision]
For example, a decision that states that HTTP traffic along the FORWARD chain outward bound from the trusted internal interface eth0 is permitted is:
-p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
A. Firewall Decision Components
The Netfilter filter table or overall firewall configuration policy is composed of a number of sub-governing local policies controlled by each of its in-built chains (Chain class) to which various protective packet condition filters (ConditionF ilter class) and their respective verdict permissions (T arget class) are applied. Netfilter provides a mechanism of three separate firewall or filtering chains to police various kinds of network traffic ( Figure 1 ). These chains filter traffic being routed to, from and beyond the firewall device itself [11] . Classes in DL represent concepts within the domain of interest and in our formal ontology model, various domain specific classes provide knowledge of the key features of Netfilter's filtering capabilities. Individual objects that belong to a class are referred to as instances of that class. We have developed a DL-based ontology for Netfilter. Figure 2 depicts a fragment of the class taxonomy for this model. The taxonomy provides the classes, subclasses and individuals that are inferred from the DL specification of the ontology. In the following subsections, we briefly illustrate some abstract examples to provide the reader with enough information as to how we codified the salient features of Netfilter in DL. Both disjoint and covering axioms are used extensively throughout our formal model. However, for reasons of space, we have opted to omit these axioms when presenting DL definitions in this paper. The reader should assume that all sibling classes defined in the paper are disjoint unless stated otherwise. Chain Types & Chain Decision Policy. Each Netfilter firewall chain must be assigned a default decision policy of 'accept' or 'drop', such that, if packets that have been correlated against the complete set of firewall decisions within that chain have not met any of the filter conditions then the default decision policy is executed to decide the fate of those packets. The following is a detailed description of the Chain class definition; it is also used to explain to the reader some of the constructors provided by DL.
The Chain class is defined as a complete class (≡), subsummed by the F irewallDomainConcept class, and as a domain concept with restrictions applied to the hasChainDecision property that binds individuals of the Chain class to individuals of another class within the firewall domain called ChainDecision. The hasChainDecision property is a binary relation that is constrained with an existential (∃ =1 ) restriction across that property with a cardinality value of 1. It states that there exists a single relationship between individuals of the Chain class and individuals of the ChainDecision class. There is also a closure axiom applied to the hasChainDecision property via the universal (∀) restriction. It states that individuals of the Chain class can only ever have hasChainDecision relationships to individuals of the ChainDecision class using that property.
The class ChainDecision defines the vocabulary for a default policy decision across a firewall chain.
Within Netfilter there are two approaches: the first is a deny everything by default, thereafter explicitly permitting selected packets; the second approach, is to accept everything by default, thereafter explicitly denying selected packets. The first approach is usually implemented as security best practice [12] . The ChainDecision class is composed of two distinct individuals: decisionDeny and decisionAccept to represent the default policy decisions that can be applied to a chain. Chains have a default policy decision in order to govern how it processes unmatched traffic. Netfilter provides a mechanism for traffic to be inspected and analyzed, depending on various pre-firewall routing decisions (Figure 1) . Thus, the Chain class provides a finite/enumeration set of three individuals namely, inputChain, outputChain and f orwardChain.
For example, the inputChain individual (instance of class Chain) is a chain to which packet condition filters and corresponding target decisions can be applied to, in order to analyze traffic incoming to local services hosted on the actual firewall itself. Filter Conditions. Netfilter firewall chains INPUT, OUTPUT and FORWARD govern routed traffic and can (and normally do) contain a set of packet filter conditions. Hence, chains act as containers for firewall decisions. The class ConditionF ilter represents the kinds of filters defined in our model:
ConditionF ilter F irewallDomainConcept
Filtering criteria that can inspect individual packets can be further subdivided into two more specialised categories: basic filtering techniques ( Class BasicF ilter) and advanced filtering techniques (Class AdvancedF ilter). Basic filtering has the ability to inspect each packet. It can be applied in various levels of granularity: to a particular interface or set of interfaces, to various protocols (MAC address, IP address or range of IP addresses, TCP, UDP and ICMP), or to a particular port or set of ports. Netfilter's advanced filtering techniques involve deep packet header inspection (TCP flags and ICMP types) and it can filter based on stateful connection state (previous packet streaming context).
BasicF ilter, AdvancedF ilter ConditionF ilter
In Target Permissions. When a filter condition matches a packet traversing a particular chain, a firewall target option specifies the fate of that packet (for example, DROP or ACCEPT the packet). Netfilter provides a mechanism of packet authorisations (class individuals) represented by the T arget class in our model for this purpose. The T arget class is defined as a complete class that details the necessary & sufficient conditions of class membership. The reader is referred to [9] for an introduction to DL's.
T arget ≡ F irewallDomainConcept {returnT arget, rejectT arget, ulogT arget, logT arget, dropT arget, acceptT arget}
B. Firewall Decision Composition
In this section, we illustrate some examples of firewall decision constraints that are constructed in terms of the model vocabulary proposed above. Various kinds of firewall decisions can be defined as subclasses of the N amedF irewallDecision class in our model. This class defines the necessary & sufficient conditions for the composition of a firewall decision. A firewall decision is composed of exactly one chain, one or more condition filters and a single permission target.
To instantiate FORWARD decisions, for example, it is first necessary to define the membership constraints of class F orwardDecision (a more specialised N amedF irewallDecision class) whereby FORWARD decisions must have a relathionship to a specific individual of the Chain class called f orwardChain:
C. Firewall Configuration
The previous sections describe an ontology for firewall configuration. A firewall decision instance, defined in terms of specific ports, protocols, etc., is represented as an instance of the ontology defined in terms of class individuals. For example, the firewall decision Atomic individuals are written in a typewriter font, while inferred individuals are given in an italic font. Note that the low-level facts of a firewall configuration are presented as individuals rather than classes on the basis that they are atomic and will not be further decomposed. Using instances (rather than subclasses) allows subsequent reasoning of collections of firewall decisions using SWRL, as outlined in [13] .
IV. E-TOURISM APPLICATION A semantics-aware travel broker provider service ( Figure 3 ) provides travel broker (intelligent) agent clients with an ability to query and purchase complete vacation/business packages based on user preferences. Typically, the travel broker client Fig. 3 . E-Tourism Abstract Architecture will interface with one or more travel broker service providers with which they have a subscription. The travel broker agent service provider interacts with various service providers (transport, accommodation, activities and so forth) on behalf of client requests. The ET ourismDomain ontology defines the knowledge within the E-Tourism application. For example, ET ourismDomain is sub-classed to describe the kinds of classes that are transport related:
T ransportService ET ourismDomain
A simple taxonomy of the overall E-Tourism ontology of this application is provided in Figure 4 . In this example, we focus on the operation of the airline service that provides three different levels of service (gold, silver and bronze) based on client contract. These service types are modeled as individuals of the FlightService class:
{gold, silver, bronze} The gold service provides unlimited access to the airline booking system which is offered to the airline's sales branch itself along with premium business partners (for example, travel brokers). The silver grade service provides a more constrained service offering but at a cheaper rate, while the bronze grade is offered to all public users.
V. BRIDGING APPLICATION & FIREWALL

A. Mapping Services to Infrastructure
The E-Tourism application requires, among other things, network resources and associated business partners. 
B. Relating Services to Firewall Decisions
A business domain ontology is used to relate service access requirements and firewall decisions. Figure 6 outlines While the N etDomain and BusinessP olicyDomain ontologies bridge firewall knowledge and application knowledge, the concrete examples (bridge configuration of individuals fd, gold and gep) are manually constructed, presumably extracted from configuration data. The following section considers how a suitable firewall configuration can be automatically selected from an existing knowledge-base and based on an E-Tourism configuration.
VI. SYNTHESIZING FIREWALL CONFIGURATIONS
Reasoning provides the ability to analyze a configuration in order to discover conflicts, for example, whether the firewall blocks a service or has conflicting decisions. It also allows the synthesis of a suitable firewall configuration, given application and bridging configuration. In this section, we consider firewall configuration synthesis. While DL-based reasoners support inferences about classes within an ontology, SWRL supports reasoning about relationships between individuals. In this paper, SWRL is used to provide synthesis of new knowledge about configuration and its integration back into the ontology.
Firewall synthesis relies on the existence of a knowledge base of candidate firewall decisions. These could, for example, represent considered best-practice for systems that host semantic web applications. The synthesis process selects the firewall decisions that are consistent with the configuration of the services (and bridge).
The following SWRL rule selects a firewall decision given a particular Extranet service access policy that currently manages an application service.
The SWRL variable ?x represents a service policy that currently manages a service, (?y), but has no firewall decision applied that provides it with the required network access controls. Should the firewall decision be deemed appropriate, this new knowledge can be asserted back into the ontology by setting the hasF irewallDecision property of the ExtranentAccess individual ?x to reflect its relationship to the firewall decision ?z.
SWRL also provides an SQL-like notation that can be used to query the DL knowledge base. For example, the query fragment:
returns a list of tuples of the form y → z, where y is a application service and z the firewall decision that provisions network access control. For example, it would be expected to return the tuple gold → fd. In practice, the above rule should contain additional filtering information to consider the protocol, interface, etc.
SWRL can be used to synthesize a variety of configuration scenarios. For example, SWRL rules can be provided, which given a specific firewall configuration can determine which services of an application can be reliably supported. This is useful when a network topology requires specific controls for systems in specific locations.
VII. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
This paper, outlined a novel approach to using a DL constrained ontology to represent: Netfilter, semantic-aware E-Tourism and business policy configurations. The Netfilter ontology reflects the semantic knowledge that a firewall administrator should 'keep in their head' when writing and/or updating firewall decisions based on the semantic application it offers protection to. We provided an E-Tourism case study to illustrate how Semantic Web applications cannot operate in a standalone manner when incorporating security features because there are situations where the infrastructure configuration (firewalls, Web proxies and so forth) may work against the normal operation of the semantic application. The business policy ontology, through the use of SWRL inferencing, facilitates access control alignment between a list of appropriate Netfilter firewall decisions and various services grades within the E-Tourism application.
The provision of reasoning, in particular within the context of the open world assumption, provides our ontology with flexibility and extendability of incorporating new knowledge. For example, our firewall ontology not only provides infrastructure knowledge that supports alignment with semanticaware applications but it also facilitates subsequent reasoning of firewall configuration conflict anomalies as outlined in [13] .
The ontologies have been implemented in OWL-DL, a language subset of OWL, a W3C standard that includes DL reasoning semantics [14] . Protégé [15] , with an incorporated OWL-DL plug-in, provide a frame-like GUI structure to create the ontologies. Pellet [16] , an open world DL compliant reasoner, provides consistency checking and automatic polyhierarchy structuring accross the ontology. The SWRL [10] , [17] Protégé plug-in, SWRLTab, interfaces with the Jess closed world inference engine to reason over relationship properties (for example, hasF irewallDecision) between individuals of our ontology.
We are currently developing a prototype autonomic architecture that is based on this ontology and reasoning framework. Firewall semantic agents are responsible for managing the configuration of a firewalls. These agents negotiate firewall settings that are constrained by the current knowledge base, which is in turn controlled by the firewall agents and other application agents, managing for example, the business rules. The knowledge base is controlled by adding or deleting facts based on new knowledge and inferences by the agents. For example, a business agent informs a firewall agent of a new customer whereby the firewall agent must reconfigure (new facts) to enable access.
APPENDIX APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION LOGIC
DL belongs to a family of logic that represents a decidable portion of first-order logic. The logic is characterised by a set of constructors (Table I ) that allows the construction of complex concepts and roles from atomic concepts or roles. Classes (concepts) represent sets of individuals and properties (roles) represent binary relations applied to individuals. Tables I and II illustrate parts of DL that are used in this paper. The reader is referred to [9] for further information. Classes are interpreted as sets of individuals and can be organised into a superclass-subclass hierarchy. For example, P rotocol is a class that represents the set of all individual protocols and its subclasses include T CP and UDP classes. Subsumption represents the superclasssubclass hierarchy, for example, T CP P rotocol indicates that T CP is a subclass of P rotocol.
Properties are used to construct binary relationships between classes. They are used when making statements about classes. For example, the following defines the concept of "ports are either privileged or unprivileged but not both":
Like classes, subproperties specialise their superproperties. For example, the property hasSrcP ort specialises the property hasP ort. This states that if two classes are related by the hasSrcP ort property then an attributed source port is a more specific relationship than the general case of having a port relationship. Properties in our model are prefixed with the word "has". DL has the following properties: functional, inverse functional, transitive and symmetric.
b) Property Restrictions: Object property restrictions are used to create constraints on individuals that belong to a particular class. Restrictions fall into three categories: Quantifier, Cardinality and hasValue restrictions. An existential (∃) restriction requires at least one relationship for a given property to an individual that is a member of a specific class. A universal (∀) restriction mandates that the only relationships for the given property that can exist must be to individuals that are members of the specified class. A property restriction effectively describes an anonymous or unnamed class that contains all the individuals that satisfy the restriction. When restrictions are used to describe classes they specify anonymous superclasses of the class being described.
c) Partial & Complete Classes:
A partial class definition is specified with necessary conditions and is of the form Class SuperClass P ropertyConditions. This states that if an individual is a member of the defined class it must satisfy the conditions that it characterises. However, it cannot be said that any (random) individual that satisfies these conditions must be a member of this class. When a class is defined with necessary and sufficient conditions (≡), like partial classes,then if an individual is a member of the class then it must then satisfy those conditions. However, with the sufficient condition included, then any (random) individual that satisfies these conditions must be a member of this class. Classes that have at least one set of necessary and sufficient conditions are known as complete classes.
d) Open World Assumption: The Closed World Assumption (CWA) and the Open World Assumption (OWA) represent two different approaches of how to evaluate implicit knowledge in a knowledge base [9] . The CWA approach makes the presumption that what is not currently known to be true in a knowledge base is false, hence the interpretation of negation as failure. However, OWA assumes that its knowledge of the world is incomplete. If something cannot be proved to be true in the known knowledge base, then it does not automatically become false. A simple example of OWA would be to assume that we know that a firewall decision has been applied to a range of privileged ports and from this information using the OWA approach one can not conclude that a firewall decision also has or has not some unprivileged ports assigned. Hence, if a class is to be confined to certain constraints, it must be explicitly stated that other unwanted constraints do not exist. In DL, OWA characteristics can be contained by stating exactly the components of a class using both disjointness and covering axioms.
